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k 
  In this paper I seek to reframe current debates around structural and cultural 
explanations concerning the interconnectedness of race and poverty in the United States.  
In recent decades discussions of race, inequality and family hardship have consolidated 
around two opposing perspectives, namely those who support a mainly structural 
explanation for chronic hardship versus those who espouse cultural explanations.  While 
underscoring the structural origins of black poverty in the United States, I seek to 
resituate how we think about and research racial disadvantage by proposing a framework 
that acknowledges the convergence of social, economic, political and cultural forces in 
contemporary society.  In so doing, I hope to spark greater interest and dialogue in the 
research and policy arenas around a more holistic approach to poverty alleviation.  
Understanding the Impact of Structural Forces 
   Two types of structural forces contribute directly to racial group outcomes such as 
differences in poverty and employment rate: social acts and social processes.   ‘Social acts’ refers 
to the behavior of individuals within society.  Examples of social acts are stereotyping; 
                                                 
* This paper is based on my new book, More than Just Race: Being Black and 
Poor in the Inner City.  New York: W.W. Norton, 2009.   2 
stigmatization; discrimination in hiring, job promotions, housing, and admission to educational 
institutions—as well as exclusion from unions, employers' associations, and clubs—when any of 
these are the act of an individual or group exercising power over others.   
  ‘Social processes’ refers to the “machinery” of society that exists to promote ongoing 
relations among members of the larger group.  Examples of social processes that contribute 
directly to racial group outcomes include laws, policies, and institutional practices that exclude 
people on the basis of race or ethnicity.  These range from explicit arrangements such as Jim 
Crow segregation laws and voting restrictions to more subtle institutional processes, such as 
school tracking that purports to be academic but often reproduces traditional segregation, racial 
profiling by police that purports to be about public safety but focuses solely on minorities, and 
redlining by banks that purports to be about sound fiscal policy but results in the exclusion of 
people of color from home ownership.  In all of these cases, ideologies about group differences 
are embedded in organizational arrangements.  
   However, many social observers who are sensitive to and often outraged by the direct 
forces of racism, such as discrimination and segregation, have paid far less attention to those 
political and economic forces that indirectly contribute to racial inequality.
1  I have in mind 
political actions that have an impact on racial group outcomes, even though they are not 
explicitly designed or publicly discussed as matters involving race, as well as impersonal 
economic forces that reinforce long-standing forms of racial inequality.  These structural forces 
are classified as indirect because they are mediated by the racial groups’ position in the system of 
social stratification (the extent to which the members of a group occupy positions of power, 
influence, privilege and prestige).  In other words, economic changes and political decisions may 
have a greater adverse impact on some groups than on others simply because the former are more   3 
vulnerable as a consequence of  their position in the social stratification system.  These indirect 
structural forces are often so massive in their impact on the social position and experiences of 
people of color that they deserve full consideration in understanding the factors leading to 
differential outcomes along racial lines.   
   Take, for instance, impersonal economic forces, which sharply increased joblessness and 
declining real wages among many poor African Americans in the last several decades.  As with 
all other Americans, the economic fate of African Americans is inextricably connected with the 
structure and functioning of a much broader, globally influenced modern economy.  In recent 
years, the growth and spread of new technologies and the growing internationalization of 
economic activity have changed the relative demand for different types of workers. The wedding 
of emerging technologies and international competition has eroded the basic institutions of the 
mass production system and eradicated related jobs in manufacturing in the United States.  In the 
last several decades, almost all of the improvements in productivity have been associated with 
technology and human capital, thereby drastically reducing the importance of physical capital 
and natural resources.  The changes in technology that are producing new jobs are making many 
others obsolete.  
   Although these trends tend to benefit highly educated or highly skilled workers, they 
have contributed to the growing threat of job displacement and eroding wages for unskilled 
workers.  This development is particularly problematic for African Americans who have a much 
higher proportion of workers in low-skilled jobs than whites.  As the late black economist Vivian 
Henderson argued three decades ago, racism put blacks in their economic place, but changes in 
the modern economy make the place in which they find themselves more and more precarious.
2    4 
  The workplace has been revolutionized by technological changes that range from 
mechanical development like robotics, to advances in information technology like 
computers and the internet.  While even educated workers are struggling to keep pace 
with technological changes, lower-skilled workers with less education are falling behind 
with the increased use of information-based technologies and computers and face the 
growing threat of job displacement in certain industries.
3  To illustrate, in 1962 the 
employment-to-population ratio—the percentage of adults who are employed—was 52.5 
percent for those with less than a high school diploma, but by 1990 it had plummeted to 
37.0 percent.  By 2006 it rebounded slightly to 43.2 percent, possibly because of the 
influx of low-skilled Latino immigrants in low-wage service-sector jobs.
4  
  In the new global economy, highly educated, well-trained men and women are in 
demand, as illustrated most dramatically in the sharp differences in employment 
experiences among men.  Compared to men with lower levels of education, college-
educated men spend more time working, not less.
5  The shift in the demand for labor is 
especially devastating for those low-skilled workers whose incorporation into the 
mainstream economy has been marginal or recent. Even before the economic 
restructuring of the nation's economy, low-skilled African Americans were at the end of 
the employment line, often the last to be hired and the first to be let go.   
  The computer revolution is a major reason for the shift in the demand for skilled 
workers.  Even “unskilled” jobs such as fast food service require employees to work with 
computerized systems, even though they are not considered skilled workers.  Whereas 
only one-quarter of US workers directly used a computer on their jobs in 1984, by 2003 
that figure had risen to more than half (56.1%) the workforce.
6  According to the   5 
economist Alan Krueger, “The expansion of computer use can account for one-third to 
two-thirds of the increase in the payoff of education between 1984 and 1993 [in the 
U.S.].”
7 Krueger gives two reasons for this expansion: First, even after a number of 
background factors such as experience and education are taken into account, those who 
use computers at work tend to be paid more than those who do not.  Second, the 
industries with the greatest shift in employment toward more highly skilled workers are 
those in which computer technology is more intensively used.  
  The shift in the United States away from low-skilled workers can also be related 
to the growing internationalization of economic activity, including increased trade with 
countries that have large numbers of low-skilled, low-wage workers.
8 Two developments 
facilitated the growth in global economic activity: (1) advances in information and 
communication technologies, which enabled companies to shift work to areas around the 
world where wages for unskilled work are much lower than in the “first world;” and (2) 
the expansion of free trade, which reduced the price of imports and raised the output of 
export industries.  But increasing imports that compete with labor-intensive industries 
(for example, apparel, textile, toys, footwear, and some manufacturing) hurts unskilled 
labor.
9   
  Since the late 1960s international trade has accounted for an increasing share of 
the U.S. economy, and, beginning in the early 1980s, imports of manufactured goods 
from developing countries have soared.
10  According to economic theory, the expansion 
of trade with countries that have a large proportion of relatively unskilled labor will result 
in downward pressure on the wages of low-skilled Americans because of the lower prices 
of the goods those foreign workers produce.  Because of the concentration of low-skilled   6 
black workers in vulnerable labor-intensive industries (e.g., 40 percent of textile workers 
are African American even though blacks are only about 13 percent of the general 
population; this overrepresentation is typical in many low-skill industries), developments 
in international trade are likely to further exacerbate their declining labor market 
experiences.
11 
  Note that the sharp decline in the relative demand for low-skilled labor has had a 
more adverse effect on blacks than on whites in the United States because a substantially 
larger proportion of African Americans are unskilled.  Indeed, the disproportionate 
percentage of unskilled African Americans is one of the legacies of historic racial 
subjugation.  Black mobility in the economy was severely impeded by job discrimination 
as well as failing segregated public schools, where per-capita expenditures to educate 
African American children were far below amounts provided for white public schools.
12  
While the more educated and highly trained African Americans, like their counterparts 
among other racial groups, have very likely benefited from the shifts in labor demand, 
those with lesser skills have suffered.  Although the number of skilled blacks (including 
managers, professionals, and technicians) has increased sharply in the last several years, 
the proportion of those who are unskilled remains large.  This is because the black 
population, burdened by cumulative experiences of racial restrictions, was 
overwhelmingly unskilled just several decades ago.
13  As urban economies have 
transformed from goods production to more of a digitized, information-focused “virtual” 
workplace, black central city residents with little or no education beyond high school see 
their access to employment increasingly restricted to low-paying jobs in the service 
sector.   7 
  The economic situation for many African Americans has now been further 
weakened because they tend not only to reside in communities that have higher jobless 
rates and lower employment growth—for example, places like Detroit or Philadelphia--
but also they lack access to areas of higher employment growth.
14  As the world of 
corporate employment has relocated to America’ s suburban communities, over two-
thirds of employment growth in metropolitan areas has occurred in the suburbs,
15 many 
of the residents of our inner-city ghettos are physically isolated from places of 
employment and socially isolated from the informal job networks that are often essential 
for job placement.  
  The growing suburbanization of jobs means that labor markets today are mainly 
regional, and long commutes in automobiles are common among blue-collar as well as 
white-collar workers.  For those who cannot afford to own, operate, and insure a private 
automobile the commute between inner-city neighborhoods and suburban job locations 
becomes a Herculean task.
16 For example, Boston welfare recipients found that only 14 
percent of the entry-level jobs in the fast-growth areas of the Boston metropolitan region 
could be accessed via public transit in less than one hour.  And in the Atlanta 
metropolitan area, fewer than one-half of the entry level jobs are located within a quarter 
mile of a public transit system.
17  To make matters worse, many inner-city residents lack 
information about suburban job opportunities.  In the segregated inner-city ghettos, the 
breakdown of the informal job information network magnifies the problems of job spatial 
mismatch—the notion that work and people are located in two different places.
18   
  Although racial discrimination and segregation exacerbate the labor-market 
problems of the low-skilled African Americans, many of these problems are currently   8 
driven by shifts in the economy.  Between 1947 and the early 1970s, all income groups in 
America experienced economic advancement.  In fact, poor families enjoyed higher 
growth in annual real income than did other families.  In the early 1970s, however, this 
pattern began to change.  American families in higher income groups, especially those in 
the top 20 percent, continued to enjoy steady income gains (adjusted for inflation), while 
those in the lowest 40 percent experienced declining or stagnating incomes.  This 
growing disparity in income, which continued through the mid-1990s, was related to a 
slowdown in productivity growth and the resulting downward pressure on wages.
19  
  Then, beginning in late 1995 productivity began to surge, averaging 2.6 percent 
annual growth and reaching an astonishing 6.4 percent annual rate in the last quarter of 
1999. Given the rate of productivity growth, a rising gross domestic product, and 
sustained low unemployment rates, the most optimistic scenario at the end of the 20
th 
century was that this new economy would eventually produce rates of family economic 
progress similar to those of the 1950s and 1960s. 
From 1996 to 2000 real wage growth—that is, wages adjusted for inflation--was 
quite impressive, especially for low-wage workers. The ranks of the long-term jobless—
defined in the US economy as those in the labor market who have been out of work for 
more than six months—plummeted from almost 2 million in 1993 to just 637,000 in 
2000. The unemployment rate of high school dropouts declined from almost 12 percent in 
1992 to less than 7 percent in 2000. The unemployment rate among blacks declined to 7.3 
percent, the lowest ever recorded since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began compiling 
comparable statistics in 1972.   9 
 More than any other group, low-skilled workers depend upon a strong economy, 
particularly a sustained tight labor market—that is, one in which there are ample jobs for 
all applicants.   In a slack labor market—a labor market with high unemployment—
employers can afford to be more selective in recruiting and granting promotions. With 
fewer jobs to award, they can inflate job requirements, pursuing workers with college 
degrees, for example, in jobs that have traditionally been associated with high school-
level education.  In such an economic climate discrimination rises and disadvantaged 
minorities, especially those with low levels of literacy, suffer disproportionately. 
   Conversely, in a tight labor market job vacancies are numerous, unemployment is of 
short duration, and wages are higher.  Moreover, in a tight labor market the labor force expands 
because increased job opportunities not only reduce unemployment but also draw in workers 
who previously dropped out of the labor force altogether during a slack labor market period.  
Thus, in a tight labor market the status of all workers—including disadvantaged minorities—
improves.     
   Just as blacks suffered greatly during the decades of growing separation between haves 
and have-nots, they benefited considerably from the incredible economic boom the country 
enjoyed in the last half of the 1990s.
20 This period saw not only substantially reduced 
unemployment and concentrated poverty (areas where 40 percent or more of the residents live in 
poverty) for blacks and other groups, but sharply increased the earnings of all low-wage workers 
as well. 
   Undoubtedly, if the robust economy could have been extended for several more years, 
rather than coming to an abrupt halt in 2001, joblessness and concentrated poverty in inner cities   10 
would have declined even more.
21 Nonetheless, many people concerned about poverty and rising 
inequality have noted that productivity and economic growth are only part of the picture.   
Thanks to the Clinton-era economic boom, in the latter 1990s there were signs 
that America's rising economic inequality that began in the early 1970s was finally in 
remission.  Nonetheless, worrisome questions were raised by many observers at that time: 
Will this new economy eventually produce the sort of progress that prevailed in the two 
and a half decades prior to 1970—a pattern in which a rising tide did indeed lift all boats?  
Or would the government's social and economic policies prevent us from duplicating this 
prolonged pattern of broadly equal economic gains?  In other words, the future of 
ordinary families, especially poor working families, depends a great deal on how the 
government decides to react to changes in the economy, and often this reaction has a 
profound effect on racial outcomes.   
In considering the effect of those political actions that may not be motivated by 
issues of race, I am reminded of economist James K. Galbraith’s observation that what is 
unique about the 1950s and 60s is that the government's policies -- social as well as 
economic -- were integral to the gains experienced by all families.  Low-wage workers 
benefited from a wide range of protections, including steady increases in the minimum 
wage, and the government made full employment a high priority. Throughout the 1960s 
these policies were accompanied by federal wage-price guidelines that helped check 
inflation.  In addition, a strong union movement emerged in the 1950s and 1960s 
following the passage of protective legislation in the 30s and 40s. The activities of unions 
ensured higher wages and more non-wage benefits for ordinary workers.   11 
In the 1970s and ’80s things, however, moved in a different direction for low-
wage workers. The union movement began its downward spiral, wage-price guidelines 
were eventually dropped, and macroeconomic policy was no longer geared toward tight 
labor markets. Monetary policy came to dominate public policy thinking on the economy, 
and it was focused on defeating inflation above all else. 
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought to the federal government a new 
focus on the economy—one in which “supply-side economics” predicted that wealth for 
the few would eventually “trickle down” as financial well-being for all.  As part of the 
Reagan experiment, the tax structure became more regressive; that is, the proportion of 
income taxes paid by the wealthy declined while the tax burden was dispersed through a 
number of other vehicles, including higher Social Security taxes.  Furthermore, 
congressional resistance to raising the minimum wage and to expanding the Earned 
Income Tax Credit threatened the economic security of disadvantaged families.  
During Bill Clinton’s eight years in office, redistribution measures were taken to 
increase the minimum wage.  But the George W. Bush administration halted increases in 
the minimum wage for nearly a decade, until the Democrats regained control of Congress 
in 2006 and voted to again increase the minimum wage in 2007.  All of these political 
acts contributed to the decline in real wages experienced by the working poor.  Because 
people of color are disproportionately represented among the working poor, these 
political acts have reinforced their position in the bottom rungs of the racial stratification 
ladder. In short, in terms of structural factors that contribute to racial inequality, there are 
indeed nonracial political forces that definitely have to be taken into account. 
   12 
Understanding the Impact of Cultural Forces   
   In addition to racial and nonracial structural forces, cultural forces may also contribute to 
or reinforce racial inequality.  Two types of cultural forces are in play: (1) national views and 
beliefs on race and (2) cultural traits—shared outlooks, modes of behavior, traditions, belief 
systems, worldviews, values, skills, preferences, styles of self-presentation, etiquette, and 
linguistic patterns—that emerge from patterns of intra-group interaction in settings created by 
discrimination and segregation and that reflect collective experiences within those settings.   
I want to avoid limited conceptions of culture defined in the simple and traditional 
terms of group norms, values, and attitudes toward family and work, and also consider 
cultural repertoires (habits, styles and skills) and the micro-level processes of meaning-
making and decision-making—that is, the way that individuals in particular groups, 
communities or societies develop an understanding of how the world works and make 
decisions based on that understanding.
22  The processes of meaning making and decision 
making are reflected in cultural frames (shared group constructions of reality.) 
Racism has historically been one of the most prominent American cultural frames 
and has played a major role in determining how whites perceive and act toward blacks.  
At its core, racism is an ideology of racial domination with two key features: (1) beliefs 
that one race is either biologically or culturally inferior to another and (2) the use of such 
beliefs to rationalize or prescribe the way that the “inferior” race should be treated in this 
society as well as to explain their social position as a group and their collective 
accomplishments.  In the United States today, there is no question that the more 
categorical forms of racist ideology—in particular, those that assert the biogenetic 
inferiority of blacks—have declined significantly, even though they still may be   13 
embedded in institutional norms and practices.  For example, school tracking, the practice 
of grouping students of similar capability for instruction, not only tends to segregate 
African American students but often results in placing some black students in lower level 
classes, even though they have the cultural capital—requisite skills for learning—to 
compete with students in higher level classes.
23  
However, there has emerged a form of what Lawrence Bobo and his colleagues 
refer to as “laissez faire racism,” a perception that blacks are responsible for their own 
economic predicament and therefore undeserving of special government support.
24   The 
idea that the federal government “has a special obligation to help improve the living 
standards of blacks” because they “have been discriminated against for so long” was 
supported by only one in five whites in 2001, and has never exceeded support by more 
than one in four since 1975.  Significantly, the lack of white support for this idea is not 
related to background factors such as level of education and age. 
The vast majority of social scientists agree that as a national cultural frame, 
racism, in its various forms has had harmful effects on African Americans as a group.  
Indeed, considerable research has been devoted to the effects of racism in American 
society.  However, there is little research and far less awareness of the impact of 
emerging cultural frames in the inner city on the social and economic outcomes of poor 
blacks.   Note that distinct cultural frames in the inner city that have not only been shaped 
by race and poverty, but in turn often shape responses to poverty, including, as we shall 
soon see,  responses that may contribute to the perpetuation of poverty.  Moreover, an 
important research question for social scientist is the following: how much of the framing 
of racial beliefs at the national level is based on the actual observed cultural traits among   14 
the inner-city poor and how much of it is the result of biased media reports and racial 
stereotypes. 
In my own earlier work, I have discussed at length how several factors determine 
the extent to which communities, as areas bounded by place, differ in outlook and 
behavior.
25  These factors include the degree to which the community is socially isolated 
from the broader society; the material assets or resources controlled by members of the 
community; the benefits and privileges the community members derive from these 
resources; their accumulated cultural experiences from current as well as historical, 
political, and economic arrangements; and the influence members of the community 
wield because of these arrangements. 
  Culture is closely intertwined with social relations in the sense of providing tools 
(skills, habits and styles) and creating constraints (restrictions or limits on behavior or 
outlooks) in patterns of social interaction.
26  These constraints include cultural frames 
(shared visions of human behavior) developed over time through the processes of in-
group meaning making (shared views on how the world works) and decision making 
(choices that reflect shared definitions of how the world works)—for example, in the 
inner-city ghetto cultural frames define issues of trust/street smarts and “acting black” or 
“acting white”—that lead to observable group characteristics.
27  
One of the effects of living in racially segregated neighborhoods is exposure to 
group-specific cultural traits (cultural frames, orientations, habits, and worldviews as well 
as styles of behavior and particular skills) that emerged from patterns of racial exclusion 
and that may not be conducive to factors that facilitate social mobility.  For example, as 
revealed in Elijah Anderson’s research, some groups in the inner city put a high value on   15 
“street smarts,” the behaviors and actions that keep them safe in areas of high crime.
28  
Street smarts may be an adaptation to living in unsafe neighborhoods.  In this 
environment, it is wise to avoid eye contact with strangers and keep to yourself.  This 
mind-set may also lead someone to approach new situations with a certain level of 
skepticism or mistrust.  Although such an approach is logical and smart in an unsafe 
neighborhood, the same behavior can be interpreted as antisocial in another setting.  
Moreover, this street-smart behavior may, in some cases, prevent individuals from 
performing well on a job interview creating a perception that that they are not desirable 
job candidates.   
Other concrete examples from the writings of both Elijah Anderson and Sudhir 
Venkatesh on the ghetto experiences might prove to be even more illuminating.
29  Each 
author reveals the existence of informal rules in the inner-city ghetto that govern 
interactions and shape how people engage one another and make decisions.  This decision 
making is influenced partly by how people come to view their world over time—what we 
call “meaning making.”  It is important to remember that the process of meaning making 
and decision making evolve in situations impose by poverty and racial segregation—
situations that place severe constraints on social mobility.  Over time, these processes 
lead to the development of informal codes that regulate behavior.   
First of all, Anderson talks about the “code of the street,” an informal but explicit 
set of rules developed to govern interpersonal public behavior and regulate violence in 
Philadelphia’s inner-city ghetto neighborhoods, where crime is high and police protection 
is low.  Anderson argues that the issue of respect is at the root of the code.  In a context 
of limited opportunities for self-actualization and success, some individuals in the   16 
community, most notably young black males, devise alternative ways to gain respect that 
emphasizes manly pride, ranging from simply wearing brand-name clothing to have the 
“right look,” and talking the right way, to developing a predatory attitude toward 
neighbors.  Anderson points out, however, that no one residing in these troubled 
neighborhoods is unaffected by the code of the street—especially young people, who are 
drawn into this negative culture both on the streets and in the schools as they must 
frequently adopt “street” behavior as a form of self defense.  As Anderson puts it, “the 
code of the street is actually a cultural adaptation to a profound lack of faith in the police 
and the judicial system—and in others who would champion one’s personal security.”
30  
A related informal but regulated pattern of behavior was described by Sudhir 
Venkatesh in his study of the underground economy in ghetto neighborhoods.  Venkatesh 
points out that “the underground arena is not simply a place to buy goods and services.  It 
is also a field of social relationships that enable off-the-books trading to occur in an 
ordered and predictable manner.”
31  This trading often results in disagreements or 
breaches because there are no laws on the books, “but the main point is that in situations 
ostensibly criminal and often threatening to personal security, there is still a structure in 
place that shapes how people make decisions and engage one another.”
32  In other words, 
informal rules actually govern what would appear on the surface to be random 
underground activity.  These rules stipulate what is expected of those involved in these 
informal exchanges and where they should meet.  Just as Anderson describes a “code of 
the street”, Venkatesh talks about a “code of shady dealings.”  
Like Anderson in his effort to explain the emergence of the code of the street, 
Venkatesh argues that the code of shady dealing is a response to circumstances in inner-  17 
city ghetto neighborhoods, where joblessness is high and opportunities for advancement 
are severely limited.  Furthermore, both Anderson and Venkatesh clearly argue that these 
cultural codes ultimately hinder integration into the boarder society and are therefore 
dysfunctional.   In other words, they contribute to the perpetuation of poverty.   
Anderson finds that for some young men the draw of the street is so powerful that 
they cannot avail themselves of legitimate employment opportunities when they become 
available.  Likewise, Venkatesh maintains that adherence to the code of shady dealings 
impedes social mobility.  The “underground economy enables people to survive but can 
lead to alienation from the wider world” he states.
33  For example, none of the work 
experience accrued in the informal economy can be listed on resume for job searches in 
the formal labor market, and time invested in underground work reduces time devoted to 
accumulating skills or contacts for legitimate employment. 
However, many liberal scholars are reluctant to discuss or research the role that 
culture plays in the negative outcomes found in the inner city.  It is possible that they fear 
being criticized for reinforcing the popular view that the negative social outcomes—
poverty, unemployment, drug addition, crime—of many poor people in the inner city are 
due to the shortcomings of the people themselves.  Indeed, the Harvard University 
sociologist Orlando Patterson maintains that there is “a deep-seated dogma that has 
prevailed in social science and policy circles since the mid-1960s: the rejection of any 
explanation that invokes a group’s cultural attributes: its distinctive attitudes, values and 
tendencies, and the resulting behavior of its members—and the relentless preference for 
relying on structural factors like low incomes, joblessness, poor schools and bad 
housing.”
34   18 
Patterson claims that social scientists have shied away from cultural explanations 
of race and poverty because of the widespread belief that such explanations are 
tantamount to blaming the victim; that is, they support the conclusion that the poor 
themselves, and not the social environment, are responsible for their own poverty and 
negative social outcomes.  He colorfully contends that it is “utterly bogus” to argue, as do 
by many academics, that cultural explanations necessarily blame the victim for poor 
social outcomes.  To hold an individual responsible for his behavior is not to rule out any 
consideration of the environmental factors that may have evoked the questionable 
behavior to begin with.  “Many victims of child abuse end up behaving in self-destructive 
ways,” Patterson states, “to point out the link between their behavior and the destructive 
acts is in no way to deny the causal role of their earlier victimization and the need to 
address it.”
35 Patterson also contends that a cultural explanation of human behavior not 
only examines the immediate relationship between attitudes and behavior but also looks 
at the past to investigate the origins and changing nature of these attitudes.   
 I agree with Patterson that cultural explanations should be part of any attempt to 
fully account for such behavior and outcomes.  And I think it is equally important to 
acknowledge that recognizing the important role of cultural influences in creating 
different racial group outcomes does not require us to ignore or play down the role of 
structural factors. 
The relative importance of cultural or structural explanations in accounting for 
behaviors and social outcomes is often debatable—though I have shown in More than 
Just Race (2009) that in terms of major effects on immediate group social outcomes 
and racial stratification, structure clearly trumps culture.
36  Nevertheless, I firmly   19 
believe that to apply these explanations totally separately, without any attempt to 
show how they interact, is indeed a mistake.  Moreover, if we are going to examine 
social and economic factors that, overtime, contributed to the development of certain 
cultural traits and related behavior, we must also pay serious attention to the 
immediate impact of structural conditions.  
I also strongly agree with Orlando Patterson that an adequate explanation of 
cultural attributes in the black community must explore the origins and changing nature 
of attitudes and practices going back decades, even centuries.  Unfortunately such 
analyses are complex and difficult.
37  It took years of research by Kathryn Neckerman to 
provide the historical evidence to explain why so many black youngsters and their 
parents lose faith in the public schools.  She shows in her book, Schools Betrayed, that a 
century ago, when African American children in most northern cities attended schools 
alongside white children, the problems commonly associated with inner-city schools—
low achievement and dropping out—were not nearly as pervasive as they are today.
38  
Neckerman carefully documents how city officials responded to increases in the 
African American student population: by introducing and enforcing segregation between 
black and white children in the city schools. And she discusses at length how poor white 
immigrant children—whose family circumstances were at least as impoverished as their 
black counterparts—received more and better resources for their education.  Over the 
course of sixty years, then, generations of children of black Chicagoans were denied the 
opportunities that their white counterparts were able to expect from the public school 
system.    20 
Although most people today understand the suppression of black aspiration that 
occurred in the Jim Crow South, few realize that this tradition of school segregation 
persisted in northern cities, as Neckerman’s book so aptly documents.  “The roots of 
classroom alienation, antagonism, and disorder can be found in school policy decisions 
made long before the problems of inner-city schools attracted public attention,” states 
Neckerman.  “These policies struck at the foundations of authority and engagement, 
making it much more difficult for inner-city teachers to gain student cooperation in 
learning.  The district’s history of segregation and inequality undermined the schools’ 
legitimacy in the eyes of its black students; as a result, inner-city teachers struggled to 
gain cooperation from children and parents, who had little reason to trust the school.”
39  
Clearly, we can more fully understand the frustration and current cultural dynamics in 
inner-city neighborhood, in this case with reference to public schools, if we understand 
the history that work like Neckerman’s uncovers.  
Finally, altough culture “partly determines behavior, it also enables people to 
change behavior.”
40   Culture provides a frame for individuals to understand their world.  
And I agree that by ignoring or only investigating culture at a superficial level, social 
scientists miss an opportunity to help people understand and then reframe attitudes in a 
way that promotes desirable behavior and outcomes.
41   
However, attitudes must be reframed in conjunction with programs that address 
structural inequities.  For example, take the problem of black male fatherhood. I would 
argue that programs focusing on the cultural problems pertaining to fatherhood, including 
attitudes concerning paternity, without confronting the broader and more fundamental 
issues of restricted economic opportunities have limited chances to succeed.  In my view   21 
the most effective fatherhood programs in the inner city will be those that address the 
framing of attitudes, norms and behaviors in combination with local and national 
attempts to improve job prospects.  Only when black fathers have a realistic opportunity 
to adequately care for their children financially will they be able to envision a more 
family-centered life for themselves and their children.  
 
Conclusion 
  For many years social scientists and other observers and analysts have debated the 
role of social structure versus culture in explaining the social and economic outcomes of 
African Americans, including their educational attainment and success in the labor 
market.   The position that one takes often reflects ideological bias.  Conservatives tend 
to emphasize cultural factors whereas liberals pay more attention to structural conditions, 
with most of the attention devoted to racialist structural factors such as discrimination 
and segregation.   
  In this paper I develop a framework for understanding the formation and 
maintenance of racial inequality and racial group outcomes that integrates cultural factors 
with two types of structural forces—those that directly reflect explicit racial bias and 
those that do not.  The longstanding problem of race in the United States calls for a bold, 
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